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Stuart: Hong Kong Inquiry

Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart
Editor's note: This document, dated 1 March 1942, is Stuart's brief to the Royal Commission which
examined the Hong Kong operation - Sir Lyman Duff, "Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force to the
Crown Colony of Hong Kong" (Ottawa, 1942), commonly referred to as the "Duff Report."

1. Introduction

I

n an inquiry of this nature it is only natural
that the alleged shortcomings of the inception,
preparation and dispatch of the Hong Kong force
will be apt to receive greater attention than the
actual accomplishment of organizing, equipping
and dispatching a force of this nature in slightly
over two weeks.
I suggest that the completion of the task of
organizing and dispatching the Hong Kong
expedition in the time available and according
to War Office specifications in practically every
detail, is in itself good evidence that the Army
was so organized and staffed that it could meet
a difficult situation rapidly and effectively. In the
light of subsequent events certain parts of our
preparations appear to be open to criticism. I
would ask the Commission to view those
criticisms not in the light of after events, but in
the light of conditions existing at the time.
On the 9th October we received the cable
from the War Office in London that enabled us
to begin our detailed preparations. Two days
later we were asked to increase the force by the
addition of a Brigade Headquarters and other
details amounting to officers and other ranks.
The force sailed form Vancouver on the 27th
October. The troopship carried all personnel, a
considerable quantity of stores, particularly
asked for, and all the equipment (less transport)
plus a substantial equipment reserve. The
transport followed on another ship on 4th
November.
I am sure that the Commission, after going
through the files and reading the outline records
of the two meetings held under the chairmanship
of Colonel (now Brigadier) Gibson, will
appreciate the large number of decisions that

had to be taken and the number of detailed
arrangements that had to be worked out by the
Staff in order to accomplish the given task in
the time available. This work was further
complicated by the need to maintain the utmost
secrecy in all phases of the preparation and
dispatch of the expedition.
For my part I breathed a sigh of relief when
I was informed that the first ship had sailed at
the time specified, without the news breaking in
the press. At the same time I felt that we had
accomplished one of the best bits of rapid
preparation and organization that had ever been
done by the Department of National Defence. We
had organized and dispatched the force in
slightly over two weeks. We had provided
practically 100% of the equipment and reserve
equipment as laid down by the War Office. We
had provided 100% of the transport and reserve
transport as laid down. This equipment and
transport was the product of Canadian industry
and its availability meant that the Hong Kong
force was the best and most completely equipped
force that had ever left the shores of Canada. In
this connection I would call your attention to a
cable M.O. 2B of 30th October from C.I.G.S to
C.G.S. Canada, which reads as underWe are very grateful to you for dispatching your
contingent to Hong Kong at such short notice.
We fully realize the difficulties of mobilization
and of distance which have had to be overcome.
The moral effect of their arrival in November
will be much greater that it would have been
two months later.

May I, at this stage of my evidence, remind
the Commission of the conditions existing at the
time of the inception and dispatch of the Hong
Kong force. We were at peace with Japan. War
was possible but not imminent, according to our
information from London. As evidence of this
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Brigadier Kenneth Stuart, DSO, MC (centre) and CD. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply (left), inspecting one
of the first Canadian-built Valentine tanks at the Angus Shops of the Montreal Locomotive Works, 27 May 1941.

statement, I would refer you to the original cable
form London dated the 19th September and the
cable received form the War Office as the late as
the 26th October. I would also refer you to the
reaction of the press throughout Canada when
the news broke that a Canadian force had landed
in Hong Kong. The reaction was not only
favourable, but enthusiastic from on side of
Canada to the other. The only criticism I can
remember seeing regarding the Hong Kong
expedition at that time was that the Government
did not make adequate use of the publicity value
of the press release. I emphasize these facts
because it is in the light of conditions as they
existed prior to the 7th December that the
various points included in the terms of reference
of this inquiry must be considered and judged.
The Canadian Army is on trial at this inquiry.
We, in the Army, find ourselves in a strange
position. As a nation we are at war and are going
through the most critical period we have ever
faced. The Army is one of the major instruments
used in the prosecution of the war. Yet, at this
critical period, when we should be devoting all
our thoughts and energies to the vital task on
hand, we are forced to turn our backs to one
main task and defend ourselves and the good
name of the Army, not against our enemies, but
against a charge of alleged gross incompetence
based on matters that could not possibly and
did not influence that final outcome of the Battle
of Hong Kong.
It is a simple matter to be wise after the event
had happened. It is a much more difficult matter
to anticipate events before they happen. I confess
44
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that I would be forced to plead guilty to the latter
charge. I realized that was with J a p a n was
possible, but I did not think Japan would take
the plunge, if she took it at all, until the collapse
either of Russia of Great Britain. Nor did I
anticipate the disastrous events of 7th December
and later. In these respects I was in good
company. Because Mr. Churchill. By his own
admission, was of the some opinions as were a
great many others in Great Britain, in the United
States and in Canada.

2. Inception of Hong Kong
Expedition

Y

ou have been told by Brigadier Gibson of
events that took place subsequent to receipt
of the telegram, No. 162, dated 19th September,
1914, from the Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs to the Secretary of State for External
Affairs. You will have noted that the records on
file are very meager in respect to this action.
The C.G.S. in his m e m o r a n d u m of 24th
September addressed to the Associate Minister
of National Defense, dealt with the risks to
Canada in the event of the two battalions being
dispatched to Hong Kong from our Home
Defence forces. He concluded that, in view of
the situation, it would not prejudice the defence
of Canada to dispatch a force of two battalions
to Hong Kong. On the some day in a record of a
telephone conversation with Mr. Ralston, the
C.G.S. specifically s t a t e d t h a t h e h a d
recommended that dispatch of the force. There
is nothing in our records to indicate the
consideration given to the matter before this
recommendation was made. I think I can explain
2
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why there is no record of these considerations.
In the first place I am satisfied that the C.G.S.
felt, in the light of the nature of the request, that
the decision was primarily a political one. I am
sure he felt, as I did every member of the General
Staff who saw the cable, that the Canadian
Government had no other course but to approve
the request of the British Government. British
and Indian troops were already in Hong Kong.
Australian, Indian and British troops were in
Singapore, Canada was asked to reinforce the
garrison at Hong Kong. There was a military risk
in sending these reinforcements to Hong Kong,
b u t we are at war and similar risks are
inescapable in was, and we accept risks of a
similar nature every time a troopship leaves the
shores of Canada. I cannot imagine anybody with
red blood in his veins suggesting that we should
have refused to accede to the British request just
because there was some risk involved. Other
parts of the Empire had accepted the risk of
Hong Kong. How could Canada refuse to accept
a similar risk and at the same time justify our
contention that we are in this war up to the limit
of our resources.
What I have just said does not mean that the
C.G.S did not give careful consideration to the
military risks involved. I know General Crerar
very well indeed, and have been associated with
him since we were at Royal Military College
together before the last war. He never makes a
decision without very carefully weighing the pros
and cons of the problem under consideration.
He did not have detailed information in respect
to the actual nature and condition of the then
existing defences of Hong Kong. He had, however,
studied the defence of Hong Kong at the Staff
College, at the Imperial Defence College and
during a two-year term of duty at the War Office
in London, he know that Hong Kong was a
defended advanced naval base. He knew that the
defences had been modernized for all round
defence, either form the sea or from the land.
He know that the land defences on the Kowloon
Peninsula known as the Gin Drinker's Line, had
been under construction since the early '30's.
he knew that the base was capable of defending
itself for a long period and that adequate reserves
of food supplies and equipment were maintained
in Hong Kong for that purpose. He knew that we
would not be at war with Japan without the
United States at our side. He knew that the
United States' battle fleet was concentrated in

the Pacific, with its major component at Pearl
Harbour. He knew that the British intended to
strengthen their naval forces at Singapore. He
knew that the Chinese were at war with Japan
and that active assistance from the Chinese could
be expected in the event of a Japanese attack on
Hong Kong through the Kowloon Peninsula. As
a result of this knowledge he undoubtedly felt
that Hong Kong was capable of defending itself
against Japan until relieved by the British and
the United States' fleets, or by active assistance
for the Chinese Army.
The point I am trying to make here is that in
General Crerar's mind there was no thought of
futility or hopelessness in connection with the
Hong Kong expedition.
Events of the 7th December at Pearl Harbour
and the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse
a few says later, completely changed the strategic
position not only in the China Sea but in the
whole of the Far Eastern regions. Japan in a few
hours attained a command of the Far Eastern
water that it was, and will be for some time,
physically impossible to challenge. The dispatch
of further assistance to Hong Kong was no longer
a feasible operation of war; much less would
there be even a fleeting opportunity to repeat
the miracle of Dunkerque.
If at the time of the inception of the Hong
Kong expedition General Crerar had felt that it
was a hopeless venture, I know that he would
not have recommended that dispatch of a
Canadian force. He knew that the garrison at
Hong Kong would be in for a bad time in the
events of war with Japan. There was a military
risk in dispatching the force but that risk, in
the light of existing conditions, was not sufficient
to warrant a recommendation from him that the
British request should be refused.
For my part I subscribed entirely to the
action taken by General Crerar. Had I been in
his position I would have taken similar action.
I have attempted to tell you what I know went
through General Crerar's mind when he was
faced with this problem. If her were here today I
do not believe he could add very much to what I
have told you . I hope it will not be necessary for
you to send for General Crerar. He is doing a
job in the U.K. that requires his full thoughts
45
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and all his energies. He is commanding the
Canadian Corps of over 100,000 men. He is now
engaged in training the formations that comprise
the Canadian Corps. He may have to fight with
that Corps any time, in these circumstances I
suggest that he must not be taken away form
his present command.

3. Selection of Units for the Hong
Kong Expedition

T

he files that the Commission have had access
to give a fairly complete story of this phase
of our preparations. The Director of Military
Training divided the units available into three
classes. The two units that were eventually
selected were in the third class because of their
need for refresher training after a long spell of
garrison duty. The period of refresher training
given to such units is usually from six weeks to
two months.
On the basis of this recommendation by the
Director of Military T r a i n i n g (Colonel,
subsequently Brigadier Lawson), the Director of
Staff Duties (Colonel Macklin) prepared a
memorandum which indicated the various
alternative methods by which two battalions
could be selected for the Hong Kong Force. He
recommended these battalions be found form
the 4th Division and that the matter be taken
up with the G.O.C., 4th Division. The Director
of Military Operations and Intelligence (Colonel
Gibson) concurred and the question came before
me. I wrote a minute to D.S.D in which I stated-

(a) Please put up alternative (a) to G.O.C, 4th
Division and ask for his recommendations.
(b) It should be impressed upon the G.O.C. that
we need the best he has."

The question was then referred to the G.O.C,
4th Division, who made strong representations
that the two battalions be not taken away for his
Division. The C.G.S. then made the decision and
selected the two battalions that were to be sent
to Hong Kong. His reasons are indicated in his
m e m o r a n d u m to the Minister dated 30th
September, 1941, which you have before you.
It would appear from the records that there
was a definite conflict of opinion as between the
C.G.S. and myself. I was not alarmed when I
heard of the decision taken and made no attempt

to discuss the matter further with the C.G.S. My
reasons for not doing so were that I felt, in the
light of all the circumstances, that his decision
was a sound one. I felt that there would be time
to give refresher courses to both of these units
prior to their departure, on the voyage and after
reaching their destination. It is important to note
that this time we were not aware of the date of
departure.
This phase of the inquiry, like that of the
inception of the expedition, suggests that
desirability of hearing General Crerar's evidence.
I trust the Commission will not consider it
imperative that General Crerar should give his
evidence in person. I am quite sure that General
Crerar could add very little to what he has
already said in his memorandum and to what
Brigadier Macklin and other officers can tell you
about this phase of the inquiry. As I have already
stated I consider that the return of General
Crerar to this country to answer questions in
connection with this inquiry represents a course
of action that would be most difficult and almost
impossible to justify.

4. The State of Training of the two
battalions selected for the Hong
Kong Expedition

T

he Winnipeg Grenadiers had been mobilized
for two years and the Royal Rifles for about
15 months. During that period both of these
units had carried out periods of garrison duty.
The Winnipeg Grenadiers had served a tour of
garrison duty in Jamaica and the Royal Rifles
had carried out a similar tour of duty in
Newfoundland. The length of time these units
had been mobilized and the fact that they had
gained experience in the same general type of
work that they would be called upon to perform
in Hong Kong must be considered in relation to
their fitness to undertake their new duty. I admit,
and all directly concerned will admit, that both
of these units required a refresher course. In
fact, our policy today is to carry out reliefs so
that all units doing garrison duty are given
refresher training after a period of garrison duty.
It is very necessary that we should have a
clear idea in our own minds as to what exactly
we mean by the term a well-trained and efficient
battalion. Training is an all embracing term and
must not be restricted to the purely mechanical
and physical side of basic and elementary

46
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss4/6

4

Stuart: Hong Kong Inquiry

training. The first is the morale training, the
second is the mental training and the third is
physical training.
Morale training seeks to develop such
characteristics as loyalty, confidence, esprit-decorps, determination, sense of duty and morale
courage. These characteristics can be and are
developed throughout the work of a unit,
irrespective of the nature of that work. Both of
these units had served as units for a considerable
period of time. Both of these units had been
reported to us as having carried out their work
in an effective manner and as far as we know
there had been no disciplinary trouble in either
of these u n i t s during the course of their
somewhat boresome garrison duty. I consider,
therefore, that we had every right to assume that
the morale of these units was good and given
good morale a unit in spite of other limitations
can, if called upon to do so, accomplish almost
any task that may confront it.
Mental training comprises the development
of constant mental alertness, initiative, judgement
and a readiness to accept responsibility. These
characteristics, like the morale characteristics,
can be developed in the normal work of the unit,
whatever its nature may be. The Winnipeg
Grenadiers, unfortunately, did not have
opportunity in Jamaica for certain types of
tactical and technical training. Nevertheless, the
garrison work they had to do, and which they
were reported to have done very well, afforded
ample opportunity for the development of the
morale and mental class of training. The same
applies to the Royal Rifles, although this unit
did have a greater opportunity for tactical and
technical training.
The physical side of training is for the
purpose of conditioning the body so that it can
fulfill the great demands of spirit and mind. Both
battalions are reported to have paid considerable
attention to this aspect of training.
The point I am trying to make here is that
the real worth of a battalion cannot be judged
solely on training reports in the tactical and
technical spheres. One must dig much deeper,
and provided the collective spirits and minds
are healthy, then other limitations can be very
quickly overcome.
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Colonel J.K. Lawson, photographed in Ottawa, 16 October 1941. At the
time he was Director of Military Training of Canada, and was subsequently
selected to command the Canadian Brigade headed for Hong Kong.

I maintain that the spirits and minds of the
two battalions selected were healthy. Both units
were well-officered a n d c o m m a n d e d by
experienced commanders. Given a few weeks to
settle down absorb their reinforcements and
refresh, then either of these units could be
expected to give as good an account of themselves
as any other units available in Canada.
May I paint out that Colonel Lawson knew
more about the condition of each of these units
than any other officer in Canada. It will be
remembered that he was Director of Military
Training of Canada at the time of the inception
of the Hong Kong expedition. I was acting C.G.S
when the cable arrived for the U.K. requesting
the Hong Kong force be increased by the addition
of a Brigade Headquarters. I discussed the
selection of Brigade Commander and Senior
Administrative Officer with General Browne the
47
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Adjutant-General. We agreed that Colonel
Lawson, the Director of Military Training, should
be offered the command of the Brigade and the
Colonel Hennessey be offered the Senior
Administrative appointment. I telephoned to
Montreal where General Crerar and Colonel
Ralston were held up in their departure for the
United Kingdom. I obtained their approval to
these two appointments. I then sent for Colonel
Lawson and asked him if he would like to
command of the Hong Kong Expedition. He
accepted and stated there was nothing in the
world he would like better. The point I wish to
make here is that Colonel Lawson knew the
condition of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the
Royal Rifles better than any other officer in
Canada. He made no representations to me
whatever in the way of suggesting changes and
was perfectly satisfies with all the arrangements
made, including the selection of units, scales of
equipment, etc. This, I consider, to be a fact of
the utmost importance Lawson never was a yes
man and everybody who knew him and worked
with him will testify to this fact. If he had felt
any qualms about the condition of the units he
would have said so in no uncertain terms.
The second point I would like to bring out
here is that Lawson's actions were based on
conditions existing at that time. He knew there
would not be time for refresher training in
Canada and was satisfied with the selection of
the units.

In the light of after events, the training of
these units is in question. In this connection, I
would point out that both units had a total of
practically two months for the refresher training
before going into action at Hong Kong; about two
weeks was available in Canada; three weeks was
available during transit and a further tree weeks
was available before operations began in Hong
Kong. Naturally, I would have preferred to have
had more time, bit I am satisfied that when we
are informed of the derails of the actual
operations at Hong Kong, we shall find that both
u n i t s acquitted themselves in a m a n n e r
creditable to Canada and that alleged lack of
training in certain particulars did not and could
not have affected the ultimate issue.
I think I can say without any possibility of
authoritative contradiction, that the two units
went to Hong Kong were better trained than most
of the units that went overseas with the 1st and
2nd Divisions.
To sum up I agree entirely with the statement
made by the C.G.S. in his memorandum to the
Minister of 30th September, that "the battalions
going to Hong Kong should be efficient welltrained battalions". I agree also with the
s t a t e m e n t made in para 10 of the above
memorandum to the effect the "both of the units
are units of proven efficiency", the latter
statement, of course, refers to the past work of
these two units. The main point at this stage

A group of soldiers from the Royal Rifles of Canada, along with the regimental
mascot, Blackie, relax prior to their departure for Hong Kong, 27 October 1941.
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appears to be whether the two units in question
lived up to the specifications outlined by the
C.G.S., namely, were they "efficient, well-trained
battalions". Given two-months period of
refresher training then I am satisfied that both
battalions would live up to specifications as
stated. Unfortunately, events did not permit of
these battalions being given the full period of
refresher training desired. On the other hand, it
can be assumed that the two-months available
was not wasted and that great strides must have
been made in the individual training during the
three weeks; voyage, and in unit and sub-unit
training during the three weeks that were
available in Hong Kong. The energy and training
ability of Brigadier Lawson is good evidence that
every advantage was taken in the time available.
I feel, therefore, that when these units actually
went into action they would have been "efficient,
well-trained battalions".
Before I leave this aspect of the preparation
of the Hong Kong expedition, I would like to point
out that the factor of availability of shipping is
tied in with our training policy. We all would like
to complete t h e t r a i n i n g of u n i t s a n d
reinforcements before sending them overseas.
We have never been able to enforce this policy
rigidly. The shortage of shipping, particularly
ships equipped to carry personnel, had been a
problem since the beginning of the war and had
become more of a problem as each month
passes. The policy we have had to lay down is
that tying in of our training programmes very
closely with those of courses overseas. This
enables us to make use of shipping space as it
is made available to us, without any lack of
continuity of training. The training of units and
reinforcements overseas continues from the
point reached in Canada prior to embarkation.
Such a policy is open to criticism. On the other
hand, it is the only practical policy to follow in
the light of the shipping situation. In the case of
the Hong Kong expedition, we were particularly
requested to make use of the sailing on the 27th
October. Failing that, another sailing would not
be available for about two months. The value of
sending our troops via this first sailing was
emphasized in the cable received for the United
Kingdom. S h o u l d we in C a n a d a have
disregarded to urgency to the British request and
have done everything possible to get the
expedition on the first sailing and completed the

refresher training in Hong Kong? I suggest, in
the light of conditions at the time, that there was
no alternative but to accept the course we did.

4. The Training of Reinforcements

Y

ou will be given the detailed picture of how
the two units were built up in reinforcements,
by officers for the Adjutant-General's Branch.
The question I shall attempt to deal with is the
extent to which the inclusion of about 150
partially trained reinforcements might affect the
efficiency of the two units.

My understanding is that these 150 men had
not fully completed their training but were very
carefully picked from the volunteers for the
units. This, I suggest, is a most important point
when you remember that training is an all
embracing term and when measured, as we are
attempting to measure it, must embrace the
characteristics of the individual in addition to
his record of technical training accomplished.
Other things being equal, it is obvious that a
man who had completed his technical training
is more useful than one who has not. On the
other hand, and speaking with the experience
of one who commanded various units in the last
war for over three years, I would say without
hesitation that I would prefer as a reinforcement
a really good man who had not completed his
full training, to an average or poor man who had
completed his training. I make this statement
on the strength of my knowledge of the power of
absorption in a good unit.
Both units were brought up to strength with
fully
trained
reinforcements.
First
reinforcements consisting of about 6 officers and
150 men per battalion accompanied the force.
Of this number, approximately 150 of the first
reinforcements for each unit had not been
completely trained. On the other hand, according
to my information, t h e s e men h a d been
volunteers and had the advantage of a further
six weeks intensive training in transit and at
Hong Kong before operations began. It is
probable that these first reinforcements were
called upon to join their units shortly after
operations began. I am satisfied, from my own
experience, that such men could have bee
absorbed in the battalions without adversely
affecting the efficiency of the unit.
49
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5. Transport

T

he situation in respect to the transport is
rather complicated. It will be explained to
you by those officers who actually dealt with this
aspect of the detailed preparations. There are
two general questions that should be asked in
connection with the preparations involved in the
shipping of the mechanical transport that was
to accompany the force. These questions are as
under:a. Why was not some mechanical transport
loaded on the troopship, and what effect would
the lack of this transport have on the fighting
efficiency of the force?
b. Why were not arrangements made for the
second ship t h a t carried the mechanical
transport to accompany the troopship, and what
effect did the non-arrival of this second ship have
on the fighting efficiency of the units?

In respect to the first question, I can only say
that so far as I know it has not been firmly
established that any transport could have been
placed on the troopship. On the other hand there
is some evidence to show that approximately 18
vehicles might have been loaded in certain space
that was alleged to be empty. The vehicles that
were ear-marked to accompany the troopship
were 6 Bren Gun Carriers, 2 Water Tanks and
the balance made up of passenger and loadercarrying vehicles.
I have a contour map here which shows that
area in which our troops were fighting in Hong
Kong. It is a very enclosed country and
mountainous. That area within the Gin Drinker's
Ling in the Kowloon Peninsula and the Island
itself, is not suitable for the use of tractor or
wheeled vehicles off the reads, other than in a
few isolated areas. I so not believe, therefore,
that the lack of these 6 carriers and of the other
transport indicated, had any appreciable effect
on the fighting efficiency of the units.
In respect to the second question. We know
that we were asked to send a two-years; reserve
of mechanical transport with the force. We did
so. My assumption is, therefore, that the British
troops in Hong Kong had a similar reserve. When
this factor is taken into consideration and also
the fact that civilian transport was available to
be used from the large centers of Kowloon and
50
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Victoria, it is difficult to see how the Canadians
transport to arrive did not affect the fighting
efficiency of the force and I am convinced that
it had no effect on the ultimate issue of the battle.
If we throw our minds back to conditions
existing at the time, it sis difficult to find any
reasonable argument to support holding up the
sailing of the troopship in order that both the
troops and the freighter carrying the transport
could sail in one convoy. The troopship was a
fast ship capable of making nearly 20 knots. The
freighter was a very slow ship capable of making
about 8 knots. At the time war with Japan was
not thought to be imminent and we had no
information at Headquarters in Ottawa to
suggest that war with Japan was likely to break
out before the arrival of the second ship. It is
interesting to speculate as to what might have
happened if both ships had sailed in the one
convoy. There are tree possibilities. The convoy
could not have got to Hong Kong according to
my information, but might have got beyond
Manila and have been picked up by the Japanese
Navy between Manila and Hong Kong. Secondly,
it might have got to Manila as did the second
ship and be now fighting with MacArthur's
forces. Finally, the convoy might have been rerouted at sea to Singapore. None of these
alternatives are very attractive.

6. Conclusion

M

ay I again emphasize the necessity to view
all aspects of this inquiry in the light of
conditions prevailing at the time and not in the
light of subsequent events. If the first course if
followed, then I consider that there is little
ground for criticism in respect to the inception
and preparation and despatch of the Hong Kong
force. In fact, I feel that in the short time
available, an excellent job was done.
Kenneth Stuart was born in 1891 in Trois
Rivieres, Quebec. He graduated from The
Royal Military College in 1911 and served
overseas with the Royal Canadian Engineers
between 1915 and 1918. He was the editor
of Canadian Defence Quarterly in the 1930s
and served as Vice Chief of the General Staff
at the time of the decision to send troops to
Hong Kong. He succeeded H.D.G. Crerar as
Chief of the General Staff in December 1941.
He died in Ottawa in November 1945.
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